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 Uncertainty and Political Perceptions
 R. Michael Alvarez
 California Institute of Technology
 Charles H. Franklin
 University of Wisconsin-Madison
 While the world of politics is uncertain, previous work, both theoretical and empirical, has largely
 failed to incorporate this uncertainty into the analysis of public opinion and electoral behavior. In this
 article we discuss measures designed to elicit the uncertainty survey respondents feel about their politi-
 cal perceptions. These measures exhibit response patterns which are interpretable, substantively inter-
 esting, and consistent with a model relating uncertainty to citizen information costs. We also find that
 variation in respondent uncertainty leads to different models of perception of political figures and
 speaks to models of the survey response. As a practical matter, our measures can easily be incorporated
 into existing surveys with no disruption of continuity.
 INTRODUCTION
 C itizens face an inherently uncertain political world yet they are nonetheless
 frequently called upon to make consequential political choices. How they incorpo-
 rate uncertainty into their perceptions and into their decision making is the focus
 of our research. We argue that while uncertainty is ubiquitous, it can be measured
 and the variation in uncertainty across individuals and political contexts stems
 from systematic differences in cognitive processes and the objective political world
 of the citizen. Our purpose here is to develop measures of uncertainty, to examine
 their properties, and show that they are consequential for both survey responses
 and for models of candidate perception.
 Uncertainty has been discussed in the social choice and game theoretic litera-
 tures as imperfect and incomplete information. However, the behavioral and em-
 pirical literatures have largely ignored imperfect information except to stress the
 prevalence of nonattitudes or limited cognitive capacities. Ignoring the ubiquity
 of uncertainty in political preferences and decision making is misguided if our
 Previous versions of this article were presented at the annual meeting of the American Political
 Science Association, Chicago, September 1992, and the Ninth Political Methodology Conference,
 Harvard University, July 16-19, 1992. We thank Steve Ansolabehere, Stanley Feldman, Simon
 Jackman, and Robert Luskin for their comments. We also thank participants in seminar discussions at
 both the University of California-Riverside and the University of California-San Diego for their in-
 sights. We are especially indebted to the Letters and Science Survey Center of the University of
 Wisconsin-Madison, for support of our data collection.
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 premise is correct that citizens are never certain about their political choices. It is
 theoretically misguided as well if politics is inherently uncertain.
 A modest number of recent works have begun to address both the theoreti-
 cal and empirical ramifications of uncertainty for political choice and perception
 (Aldrich et al. 1982; Alvarez 1992; Bartels 1986; Brady and Ansolabehere 1989;
 Enelow and Hinich 1981; Enelow and Hinich 1984; Franklin 1991; Page 1978;
 Palfrey and Poole 1987; Shepsle 1972). In addition, recent developments in the
 theory of the survey response are closely connected to respondent uncertainty
 (Zaller and Feldman 1992).
 What is missing from these works is a consensus on how to measure and model
 uncertainty. Some use indirect indicators based on other survey measures (Alvarez
 1992; Bartels 1986) while others rely on statistical models in which uncertainty
 appears as a parameter which is estimated (Franklin 1991). In one case, direct
 measurement of uncertainty has been attempted, albeit with disappointing results
 (Aldrich et al. 1982). Each of these approaches has produced rewards but the dis-
 tance of most indicators from direct measures of respondents' subjective uncer-
 tainty is problematic. When direct measurement is unavailable, we are forced to
 rely on statistical modeling and assumptions about the role of unobserved latent
 variables. We can make considerable progress in this fashion, as the citations
 demonstrate, but we could make more progress if we had direct measures of our
 variables. Our aim in this article is to develop such direct measures and demon-
 strate their properties and effects.
 Uncertainty, as we approach it, is inherently subjective. A citizen is uncertain if
 he or she feels uncertain. We are free to construct a wide variety of formal and sta-
 tistical models to represent this subjective feeling and to assess the fit of these
 models to data. But at root, it is the individual who feels uncertain or not, and that
 feeling is not affected by our poor attempts at formalization. Rather than develop a
 model and then devise a measure which comports with the model, we prefer to de-
 velop the most direct measure we can. If this measure turns out to work well in
 our models, then this encourages our modeling. If not, then perhaps the model
 does not represent well the respondent's subjective state, but this failure does not
 deny the subjective experience.
 In keeping with this approach, we simply ask respondents how certain they feel
 about their own preferences and the positions of political figures. Such a design is
 no more and no less fraught with difficulties than any survey measure of subjec-
 tive states. We must assume that language provides an adequate medium for the
 reporting of feelings and that the plain words of the survey item are clear enough
 for the respondent to understand what we are asking. Our measures, then, are the
 respondent's report of their subjective uncertainty, in terms of the response op-
 tions we provide. We can then assess whether these measures appear valid based
 on our expectations of how they should relate to other variables.
 Our theoretical model (as opposed to our measurements) is based on conceiv-
 ing of uncertainty as a probability distribution over possible outcomes. Such a
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 distribution has an expected value and a variance. The larger the variance, the less
 certain is the outcome. This abstraction is common to both economic notions of un-
 certainty (Enelow and Hinich 1984; Shepsle 1972) and mathematical-psychological
 conceptions. As this article is primarily concerned with the empirical performance
 of our measures, we have relatively little to say about this formalization here.
 In the next section of this article we discuss the survey questions we developed,
 the methodology of the national telephone survey we undertook, and the response
 patterns these survey measures elicited. The subsequent sections contain a set of
 analyses designed to validate these as measures of uncertainty, and then to use the
 measures to better understand the policy perceptions of citizens. We close with a
 discussion of the implications of our research.
 SURVEY MEASURES OF UNCERTAINTY
 The data we analyze comes from a national telephone survey conducted in the
 fall of 1991 and winter of 1992 by professional interviewers at the Letters and
 Science Survey Center of the University of Wisconsin-Madison. A national
 probability sample of 797 adults from the 48 contiguous states were interviewed.
 Multiple callbacks were attempted to secure an interview, though no refusal con-
 version of initially unwilling respondents was done. A CATI system provided ran-
 domization of survey forms. Of the sample, 53.2% (424 cases) were assigned to
 the first survey group (form A), and 46.8% (373 cases) were assigned to the sec-
 ond group (form B). Our analysis in this article is confined to form B respondents.
 The survey was in the field from October 2, 1991, until March 5, 1992, with the
 bulk of interviewing occurring from November through February.
 Since part of our purpose was the development of new survey measures, we
 tested two alternative sets of uncertainty questions (forms A and B) using ran-
 domly selected half samples. Each respondent was questioned about one of the
 U.S. senators from their state, the senator being randomly assigned. Respondents
 in each half-sample were presented a series of questions concerning their prefer-
 ences and their perceptions of the senator's positions on two policy issues (tax in-
 creases and abortion) and on the liberal-conservative ideological dimension using a
 seven-point scale format. '
 'The wording of our seven-point scales is presented here. These were modified for form A to en-
 courage "range" responses. Since this does not figure in the current article, we present only the form B
 wording. To measure the senator's perceived position the question was modified by prefixing "What
 about Senator [senator's name] from your state? Where would you place [senator's name] on this scale?"
 Taxes. Some people feel that the federal government should not raise taxes under any circum-
 stances. Others feel that a tax increase is required to reduce the deficit and pay for needed programs.
 Where would you place yourself on a scale from one to seven, where 1 means you feel taxes should not
 be raised under any circumstances and 7 means you feel that a tax increase is required to reduce the
 deficit and pay for needed programs?
 Abortion. Some people feel that abortions should be illegal. Others feel that there should be no
 restrictions on a woman's right to an abortion if she wants one. Where would you place yourself on a
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 After each seven-point placement of their own position, respondents were
 asked: "Are you very certain of where you stand on this, pretty certain, or not very
 certain?" Next, following the placement of the senator, we probed for uncertainty
 about that position, asking "How certain are you of (senator's name) position on
 this? Very certain, pretty certain, or not very certain?" These options deliberately
 parallel the options for the respondent's own position. Respondents were ran-
 domly assigned to one of the senators from their state to maximize variation in
 characteristics of the senators we used as perceptual objects.
 The variation in the uncertainty question wording between forms A and B
 compared a dichotomous response option with a three-point ordinal scale to ex-
 amine respondents' abilities to make finer distinctions about their level of uncer-
 tainty.2 Our preliminary analysis of these survey items demonstrated the superiority
 of the three-point ordinal scale so we will focus exclusively on these items here.3
 Table 1 shows the marginals for certainty of own position and of the senator's
 position.4 The top panel in table 1 (respondent's own certainty) shows first that
 many more respondents were certain of their opinions on the abortion scale than
 on the other two scales, as we would expect. More than three-fourths of the re-
 spondents stated that they were very certain of their abortion position, compared
 to 50.4% on the liberal-conservative scale and 41.8% on the tax increase issue.
 scale from one to seven, where 1 means you feel abortions should be illegal and 7 means you feel there
 should be no restrictions on a woman's right to an abortion?
 Liberal/Conservative. In politics, some people have very liberal political views while other people
 have very conservative political views. Where would you place yourself on a scale from one to seven,
 where 1 means you have very liberal political views and 7 means you have very conservative political
 views?
 2Another question wording variant which we do not analyze in this article concerned the wording of
 the seven-point scales. Form A respondents were read an introduction to the seven-point scale ques-
 tion designed to reveal the uncertainty in their perceptions, called "range formats," which are nearly
 identical to those employed in the 1980 National Election Study's Pilot Study. This question format
 was used in form A for both the respondent's own position on each issue, as well as their perception of
 the senator's position. These invite the respondent to place themselves or the senator within some
 range, rather than at a single point, if they feel uncertain about the exact position. Form B respondents
 were read introductions to the seven-point scale questions very similar to that encountered in the usual
 NES survey, not utilizing the "range formats." Unfortunately, the results of the range format were
 disappointing. Only 6.0% of respondents gave a range response for their own position on the tax in-
 crease issue, 4.8% on the abortion scale, and 6.9% on the liberal-conservative dimension. This com-
 pares to a 1.3% rate of unsolicited range placement in Form B on both the tax and abortion scales, and
 2.6% on the liberal-conservative scale.
 3The substantive conclusions of our various analyses are virtually identical for the form A dichoto-
 mous items.
 4Respondents are asked the certainty items only if they are able to respond to the corresponding
 seven-point scale. This accounts for the variation in sample sizes across cells of the table. The maxi-
 mum possible N is 373. Including this source of nonresponse in the table does not alter our conclu-
 sions. If failure to respond to the seven-point scale represents extreme uncertainty, then table 1
 understates the absolute level of uncertainty but not the relative levels of uncertainty which are our
 focus. The reader can easily recompute the percentages in the table for comparison.
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 TABLE 1
 RESPONDENT CERTAINTY BY OBJECT AND ISSUE
 Response to Self-Placement Certainty Question
 Taxes Abortion Lib/Con
 Response N % N % N %
 Very 146 41.8% 272 77.7% 180 50.4%
 Pretty 166 47.6% 68 19.4% 144 40.3%
 Not 35 10.0% 8 2.3% 27 7.6%
 DK 1 0.3% 1 0.3% 1 0.3%
 NA 1 0.3% 1 0.3% 5 1.4%
 Totals 349 350 357
 Response to Senator Certainty Question
 Taxes Abortion Lib/Con
 Response N % N % N %
 Very 24 12.2% 35 21.5% 46 21.2%
 Pretty 72 36.6% 55 33.7% 109 50.2%
 Not 98 49.8% 71 43.6% 60 27.7%
 DK 1 0.5% 2 1.2% 1 0.5%
 NA 2 1.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.5%
 Totals 197 163 217
 Also, there was a low item nonresponse rate on this question format, less than 1%
 on the first two dimensions, and less than 2% on the liberal-conservative scale.
 In the bottom panel of table 1, we see a considerable amount of uncertainty
 among those respondents who placed the senator on the scale. Almost 50% said
 they were not very certain about their senator's position regarding a tax increase,
 with 43.6% and 27.7% giving the same answer on the abortion and liberal-
 conservative scales, respectively.
 In comparison with self-placements, uncertainty about senator placements is far
 greater. In table 1, no more than 10% said they were not very certain about their
 own position. Yet no less than 28% and as many as half say they are not very cer-
 tain of the senator's position. This demonstrates the vastly greater uncertainty
 concerning senator's positions and it also shows that the not very certain option is
 a very useful category when uncertainty levels are high. While few used this cate-
 gory when describing themselves, its use is common when senators are the object
 of uncertainty.
 This first glance at the data reveals several important bits of evidence. First, the
 response patterns provide prima facie evidence that the questions are eliciting the
 desired responses. Second, the amount of nonresponse on these items is very low,
 meaning that we are not asking respondents questions which are so complex or
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 confusing that they have trouble providing an answer. Third, the three-point
 measure captures wide variations in uncertainty, as demonstrated by the slight use
 of the most uncertain category when describing self-placement as compared to the
 very substantial use of this category when describing the senator.
 While respondents seem relatively certain of their own positions on each of the
 issue scales, they appear quite unsure of their senator's stand. This suggests that
 the locus of political uncertainty is less in what people think they want and more a
 matter of being unable to say with much confidence what is being offered by their
 elected representatives. If this uncertainty is constant across representatives, it is
 an impairment to choice but not especially loaded with political import. If, how-
 ever, candidates are able to manipulate such uncertainty, as suggested by Franklin
 (1991), then uncertainty becomes an inescapable component of the politics of rep-
 resentation.
 A further substantive conclusion from these simple data is that voters are not
 uniformly handicapped by nonattitudes or cognitive limitations. If respondents
 were in fact finding it difficult to understand our issues, we would expect them to
 exhibit similar levels of uncertainty about both themselves and the senator.
 Instead, we find a dramatic contrast in uncertainty. This strongly suggests that
 when voters have sufficient information they are generally able to form rather con-
 fident positions. But when faced with either lack of information or ambiguous
 signals, their reported uncertainty soars. This rules out a simple nonattitudes ex-
 planation for our results and shows that uncertainty responses are able to discrimi-
 nate across objects within a single issue.5
 THE VALIDITY OF THE UNCERTAINTY SURVEY ITEMS
 In this section, we demonstrate that respondents vary in their measured uncer-
 tainty by information levels and information costs, and by the availability of con-
 textual political information. Our approach validates the survey measures by
 showing that they tap into the factors they are designed to measure. Here, we
 show that the uncertainty items are correlated in expected ways with a set of ex-
 planatory variables (Cook and Campbell 1979).
 To test these models, we use a set of explanatory variables accounting for sev-
 eral demographic factors, political information held by the respondent, as well as
 the ideological extremity of the senator, whether the senator was a member of two
 relevant committees (Finance or Labor and Human Resources), and the length
 of time since the senator has had to face an election.6 Our hypotheses for these
 51t would be useful to relate our measures of uncertainty to response stability. A new panel data col-
 lection will soon allow us to conduct this analysis.
 6These were coded as: education 1 (less than high school degree), 2 (only high school degree), 3
 (more than high school), 4 (post-high school degree); race 0 if white and 1 if minority; religion 1 if a
 Catholic or Baptist, 0 otherwise; political information 0 if unable to rate Rehnquist on a feeling ther-
 mometer and 1 if able to rate Rehnquist, following the approach advocated by Zaller (1989, 1991);
 senator's ideological extremity was given by a folded ADA scale, where 0 indicated extreme and 50
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 indicators follow the logic in Downs (1957): those individuals with lower informa-
 tion costs are expected to be better informed about their political perceptions.
 Thus, those with higher educational levels and more political information are ex-
 pected to be more certain in their perceptions. The minority status and gender
 variables capture the particular sensitivity of these groups to certain issues while
 their position in society may act to raise other information costs. We expect
 women to be more attuned to information about abortion while minorities should
 be more concerned for maintaining social programs even if taxes go up. This
 greater personal stake is expected to lower information costs for these issues.
 Outside these areas of increased personal stakes, however, we expect information
 costs to be higher because of the more peripheral social and political position of
 these groups. The religion indicator is intended to show that those who are mem-
 bers of certain religious groups might be better informed about the abortion issue
 than others. The data about the senators are from Congressional Quarterly Weekly
 Report, May 1992. The ADA scale was folded into an ideological extremity index.
 The variable for the senator's last electoral stand is the difference between the year
 of their last election and the current year. The committee membership variables
 are dummy indicators for two policy-relevant committees, Senate Finance (taxes)
 and Labor and Human Resources (abortion). Our hypotheses regarding these in-
 dicators are that respondents with more ideologically extreme representatives,
 those with the most recently elected senators, and those with senators who are
 policy specialists on tax and social policies, should be more confident in their per-
 ceptions of their representatives than other respondents, either through a cogni-
 tive inference process drawing upon this information about their representative,
 or through greater information about the senator's position on these issues. In our
 subsequent analysis we employ a one-tail test, since we specify the direction of the
 effects we expect. Since our sample is quite limited, approximately 200 cases, we
 also allow a generous .10 significance level.7
 We coded the responses so that the high category was the most certain response
 and the low the least certain. Given the ordered nature of this categorical variable,
 we estimated ordered probit models for these survey items following McKelvey
 and Zavoina (1975), given in table 2. This table is organized into three columns,
 where the first column gives the maximum-likelihood estimates and their associ-
 ated standard errors for the tax increase question, the middle column for the abor-
 tion item, and the last column for the liberal-conservative item.
 In table 2 we find evidence that these survey responses are systematically
 related to our independent variables. Almost all of the variables are correctly
 signed and 8 of 12 coefficients are statistically significant. Education and political
 moderate; Finance member 0 if not a member of Senate Finance and 1 if member; Labor and H.R.
 Member 0 if not a member of Labor and Human Resource and 1 if member; and last election was cal-
 culated as the year of the senator's last election minus 1992.
 7All of the models in this article were estimated in Dubin and Rivers' (1989) SST, version 2.0.
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 TABLE 2
 ORDERED PROBIT MODELS OF RESPONDENT CERTAINTY
 Independent Variables Taxes Abortion Lib-Con
 Intercept 0.87** 1.54** 0.86**
 (0.22) (0.27) (0.22)
 Education 0.15** 0.08 0.24**
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
 Political info 0.10 0.32** 0.16
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.14)
 Gender -0.22** 0.31** -0.15
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.13)
 Race 0.41** -0.31* -0.26*
 (0.20) (0.22) (0.20)
 ,u ~~~~~~ ~~1.52** 1.25** 1.51**
 (0.10) (0.15) (0.11)
 LLR(d-f ) 19-7(4)** 17.1(4)** 38.7(4)**
 p-value .0006 .0018 .0000
 % correct 53.3 78.1 52.6
 ry,.v 0.21 0.18 0.27
 N 345 343 346
 Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ,u is the probit threshold between response categories. The
 first threshold is normalized to zero.
 p = 0.10; **p = 0.05; both one-tailed tests.
 information have correctly signed coefficients for each issue, three of which reach
 conventional levels of significance. These coefficient estimates are consistent with
 our hypothesis that those with lower information costs are more certain in their
 own positions.
 The log-likelihood ratio test strongly rejects the null hypothesis that none of
 the independent variables are related to our measure of respondent uncertainty.
 We also present two goodness of fit measures. First, the percent correctly pre-
 dicted ranges from 52.6% to 78.1%. Second, the correlation between observed
 outcomes and the predicted values from the probit model (labeled ryj in the table)
 ranges from .18 to .27.8
 We have hypothesized that gender and race should reflect social factors gener-
 ally leading individuals in these groups to have higher information costs. On is-
 sues which touch the group directly, however, we hypothesized lower information
 costs and hence greater certainty. This expectation is supported. Racial minorities
 8The problematic nature of goodness of fit measures for limited dependent variable models are well
 known (see Greene 1993, 651-53). Our position is that the log-likelihood ratio tests the natural null
 hypothesis and has the virtue of being firmly grounded in statistical theory, something goodness of fit
 measures lack. We present the two goodness of fit measures with the understanding that 100% correct
 prediction is more likely to result from serious troubles with the model rather than a perfect model
 (Greene, 651), and that the correlation measure presented is not bounded above by 1.0 but rather by
 something less than 1.0 which depends on the distribution of the outcomes.
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 are more certain of their tax positions than whites, while less certain of their ideo-
 logical and abortion positions, ceteris paribus. Likewise, women are more certain of
 their position on abortion than men, but less certain than men of their tax position
 while the ideological position results show no consistent difference. It is not much
 of a stretch to conclude that these patterns are due to the peculiar relationships of
 these groups to particular issues. While our evidence is surely tentative, it is per-
 haps not too great a leap to conclude that where issues touch more directly on the
 individual, preferences are likely to be more precisely defined.
 Next, we estimated similar models examining the uncertainty responses for the
 senator's issue positions and those are presented in table 3. We made one significant
 TABLE 3
 ORDERED PROBIT MODELS OF CERTAINTY OF SENATOR'S POSITION
 Independent Variables Taxes Abortion Lib-Con
 Intercept 0.14 -0.45* 0.26
 (0.24) (0.27) (0.24)
 Education -0.03 0.05 0.05
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
 Political info 0.49** 0.59** 0.45**
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
 Gender -0.47** -0.31** -0.51**
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.12)
 Race 0.14 0.02 -0.10
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
 Ideological extremity 0.009** 0.006* 0.0005
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
 Finance committee 0.09
 (0.15)
 Labor-H.R. 0.30*
 Committee (0.18)
 Last election -0.02 -0.04 -0.004
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
 Religion 0.22*
 (0.13)
 ,u, 0.78** 0.60** 0.47**
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
 A2 1.75** 1.29** 1.53**
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
 LLR(d.f.) 55.5(7)** 49.1(8)** 55.2(6)**
 p-value .0000 .0000 .0000
 % correct 46.4 54.8 44.7
 ry,y 0.33 0.33 0.34
 N 351 352 349
 Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Iu is the probit threshold between response categories. The
 first threshold is normalized to zero.
 p = 0.10; **p = 0.05; one-tailed tests.
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 modification to our coding of the dependent variable in these analyses. Substantial
 numbers of respondents failed to place their senator on each seven-point scale. In
 this case, we did not ask the uncertainty question, having just been told the re-
 spondent did not know where the senator was located. This leads to attrition of
 cases. However, it also offers an opportunity. Bartels (1986) uses the "don't know"
 response as an indicator of uncertainty. In our case, it is natural to treat these
 "don't know" respondents as more uncertain than those who place the senator,
 but then say they are not very certain of the location. We therefore combine don't
 know responses to the placement item with the uncertainty item, coding don't
 knows below the "not very certain" category. This has the virtue of avoiding sam-
 ple selection effects while showing how Bartels' approach can fit into our own.
 Among the demographic variables in the ordered probit models, the indicator
 for gender is negatively signed and statistically significant in all models. This holds
 even for the abortion item, where earlier we saw that women were more certain
 than men about their own position. It appears that the earlier effect does not carry
 over to information about candidates but is restricted to information about the
 self. The effects of race are not noticeably different from zero. However, the reli-
 gion indicator is positive and significant in the abortion equation, as expected.
 Similarly, the political information indicator is positive and strongly significant in
 all models. The committee membership indicator is correctly signed but is statisti-
 cally significant in only the abortion model. There is no indication, though, that
 recency of election plays any role. And contrary to our expectations, the ideologi-
 cal extremity indicator is always positive, and twice significant, indicating that re-
 spondents were more certain of more moderate senators.
 We demonstrated in this section that the measures we advocate for directly
 measuring perceptual uncertainty are related to various criterion variables in rea-
 sonably predictable ways. This was accomplished through a series of models in
 which we have shown that the responses in our survey to these questions varied
 systematically across respondents in the patterns we would expect were these ques-
 tions measuring uncertainty. Therefore, we can feel reasonably confident that our
 questions are valid measures of perceptual uncertainty. However, there remains
 the issue of the utility of these measures for our understanding of substantive re-
 sponses to politicians. This is the topic of the next section.
 UNCERTAINTY AND THE PERCEPTION OF POLITICAL FIGURES
 While uncertainty may be ubiquitous it would remain uninteresting if it were
 without consequences. In this section, we demonstrate two consequences of un-
 certainty for the perception of political figures. First, we consider the effect of un-
 certainty on the distribution of responses. Second, we show that perceptions are
 structured differently among certain and uncertain respondents.
 There has been little work to guide our efforts in this area. The primary ave-
 nue through which respondent uncertainty might influence perceptions has been
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 described by a handful of researchers (Alvarez 1992; Brady and Ansolabehere
 1989; Bartels 1988; Franklin 1991; Shepsle 1972). This work has conceptualized
 respondent perceptions as probability distributions, with a central tendency and a
 variance. The larger the variance the greater the uncertainty.
 There are two ways in which respondents might answer survey questions based
 on this model. First, respondents might draw an observation from the distribution
 and report the position drawn. We call this the "random sampling" response
 model. Such a model would be generally compatible with the survey response
 model developed by Zaller and Feldman (1992). The variability in individual re-
 sponses would thus provide an indicator of the underlying respondent uncer-
 tainty, which we could estimate.9 This model was used by Franklin (1991) to
 estimate campaign-induced uncertainty.
 Alternatively, respondents might report the central tendency of their distribu-
 tion of perceptions, which we call the "expected value" response model. In this
 case, the variance of the distribution would be independent of the expected value.
 Thus, the observed responses would tell us little about the underlying uncer-
 tainty. For example, two respondents might both have a perceptual distribution
 centered at the same point, while one has a large variance and the other a small
 variance. If respondents report the expected value, then both will provide the
 same reported perceptions.
 While the variance and expected value are independent in principle, in practical
 survey situations they are related. A natural way to represent maximum uncer-
 tainty on a seven-point issue scale is as a uniform distribution. Such a distribution
 naturally leads to an expected value of 4.0. Thus if respondents report expected
 values, we should expect the most uncertain to report positions concentrated
 around 4 on our issue scales. If respondents sample randomly from the entire dis-
 tribution however, as predicted by the first response model, we should see re-
 sponses spread more or less evenly across the issue scale. In either case, uncer-
 tainty would have significant consequences for our survey measures.
 Our first cut at this effect is presented in table 4. Here we simply present the
 distribution of perceived senator positions by our measures of uncertainty. The
 chi-square test confirms what is apparent to the eye: respondents who say they are
 more uncertain of the senator's position have an increased affinity for placing the
 senator near the midpoint on each issue scale.10
 As a rough cut, these results offer greater support for the expected value re-
 sponse model than for the random sampling model. However, they suffer from the
 fact that there is variability in the objects of perception which are not accounted
 for in the table. This is most apparent from the "certain" column of table 4 which
 9Alternatively, several samples could be taken and the mean of these samples could be reported. In
 either case, the variance of the responses would be related to the variance of the underlying distribu-
 tion.
 'OA similar result was discussed by Brady and Sniderman, appendix 2 (1985).
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 TABLE 4
 RESPONSE PATTERNS TO SEVEN-POINT SCALES
 PERCEIVED SENATOR'S POSITION BY CERTAINTY
 Lib / Con
 Position Not Pretty Certain
 1 5.0 4.6 21.7
 2 5.0 5.5 13.0
 3 13.3 16.5 6.5
 4 31.7 23.9 8.7
 5 23.3 25.7 13.0
 6 13.3 12.8 6.5
 7 8.8 11.0 30.4
 X 2 38.41
 N 66 109 46
 Abortion
 Position Not Pretty Certain
 1 9.9 29.1 22.9
 2 5.6 14.6 11.4
 3 21.1 7.3 2.9
 4 25.4 12.7 11.4
 5 16.9 14.6 0.0
 6 5.6 10.9 8.6
 7 15.5 10.9 42.9
 X 2 39.71
 N 71 55 35
 Taxes
 Position Not Pretty Certain
 1 13.3 13.9 29.2
 2 3.1 9.7 4.2
 3 24.5 11.1 12.5
 4 24.4 15.3 8.3
 5 22.5 22.2 8.3
 6 5.1 15.3 8.3
 7 7.1 12.5 29.2
 X 2 29.41
 N 98 72 24
 Note: I indicates a x2 significant at the p = 0.05 level.
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 appears to suggest that high certainty respondents are apt to pick one extreme or
 the other. This is misleading, however, for it is likely that respondents who place
 their senator at 1 are responding to a different senator from those who place their
 senator at 7.
 To remove this confounding effect, while estimating the impact of uncertainty
 on responses, we used both binary and ordered probit models. The binary probit
 models we report here were estimated for the liberal-conservative scale."1 We
 recoded the seven-point placements of each respondent into a binary variable
 coded 1 for those placing the senator in one of the middle categories (3,4,5) or 0 for
 those placing the senator on either end of the scale (1,2 or 6,7). The central hypothe-
 sis is that uncertain respondents will place their senator in the middle categories, con-
 trolling for political information, education, and the senator's ideological extremity.
 The results of the binary probit analysis are in the first column of table 5. The
 certainty variable has a significant negative coefficient, showing that more uncer-
 tain respondents are more likely to place the senator in the middle of the scale
 while more certain respondents are less likely to use the middle range.
 As an additional test of this hypothesis, we estimated ordered probit models
 using the full seven-point response. If uncertain respondents are more likely to
 use middle categories, after controlling for objective characteristics of the senator,
 this would show up in the thresholds between categories estimated for certain ver-
 sus uncertain respondents. We would expect the middle categories to be wider for
 the uncertain.
 The results are in the second and third columns of table 5. The important coef-
 ficients in these two columns are the five estimated thresholds, which are denoted
 by Jk. Remembering that u0 is normalized to zero, ul is the threshold separating
 responses of 2 and 3, while u4 divides responses 5 and 6. Our interest centers on
 the distance between gu, and ,4. We expect uncertain respondents to have a greater
 distance between these thresholds, showing that ceteris paribus they are more likely
 to use categories 3, 4, or 5. For the uncertain, this distance is 2.45 - .36 = 2.09
 while for the certain respondents it is 1.56 - .51 = 1.05. The range for the uncer-
 tain is almost twice what it is for the certain, as we expected. This difference also
 shows up if we focus exclusively on the exact midpoint of the scale, a response of
 4. For the uncertain m3 - 12 = 0.87 while for the certain it is 0.34. Thus we see that
 controlling for objective characteristics of the senator, the uncertain respondents
 are substantially more likely to respond with a placement at or near the middle of
 the seven-point scale than are respondents who say they are very certain.12
 These findings have implications for how we understand the survey response
 and for how we model respondent perceptions of political figures on policy issues.
 "IThe results are similar for the abortion and tax scales.
 '2We can also put this in probability terms. A senator whose ideology and party would predict place-
 ment in the exact center of category 2 on the seven-point scale, has a .3035 chance of being placed in
 categories 3, 4, or 5 by a respondent who is certain, and a .4170 chance by an uncertain respondent, an
 increase of 37.4%.
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 TABLE 5
 PROBIT MODELS OF SEVEN-POINT IDEOLOGICAL SCALE RESPONSES
 Independent Variables Binary Ordered (Certain) Ordered (Uncertain)
 Intercept 0.83** -1.54* 2.03**
 (0.33) (0.86) (0.56)
 Certainty -0.54**
 (0.13)
 Political info. 0.18
 (0.15)
 Education 0.04
 (0.06)
 Ideological -0.00
 extremity (0.00)
 Sen. ideo. 0.04** -0.002
 (0.01) (0.007)
 Sen. party 1.57** -0.42
 (0.76) (0.42)
 0.51** 0.36**
 (0.12) (0.14)
 A 2 0.75** 0.93**
 (0.11) (0.14)
 tk(3 1.09** 1.80**
 (0.12) (0.13)
 tk4 1.56** 2.45**
 (0.1I1) (0.13)
 uk5 1 .81** 3.05**
 (0.13) (0.20)
 LLR(d.f.) 22.0(4)** 24.6(2)** 1.44(2)
 p-value .0002 .0000 .4868
 % correct 66.8 47.8 31.7
 ry,.p 0.29 0.67 0.16
 N 214 46 60
 Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ,u is the probit threshold between response categories. The
 first threshold is normalized to zero.
 p = 0.10 level; **p = 0.05 level; both one-tailed tests.
 It is clear that uncertain individuals are more likely to state that their senator has a
 moderate position on the scale, regardless of the senator's roll-call record and
 party. This survey response may reflect the respondent's best guess as to the sena-
 tor's position, as the expected value response model would suggest. But it has the
 consequence of reducing the variance in observed responses among the respon-
 dents who are least certain of their answers, exactly the opposite of what we would
 expect under the random sampling response model.
 Uncertain respondents are also less likely to use information about political fig-
 ures in forming perceptions of them. To demonstrate this claim, we estimated a
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 TABLE 6
 PLACEMENT MODELS BY UNCERTAINTY
 Independent Variables Uncertain Certain
 Intercept 4.60 3.80**
 (0.96) (0.65)
 Sen. ideo. -0.004 0.02**
 (0.01) (0.007)
 Sen. party -0.89* 0.11
 (0.64) (0.49)
 Resp. ideo. 0.12 -0.10*
 (0.12) (0.07)
 Project inter. 0.002 0.004**
 (0.002) (0.001)
 Adj. R2 0.00 0.23
 N 54 105
 Note: OLS estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.
 p = 0.10 level; **p = 0.05 level; both one-tailed tests.
 standard model of ideological perceptions, similar to that advanced by Franklin
 (1991). Here, the respondent's perception of the senator's ideological position is
 assumed to be a linear function of the senator's position as given by interest group
 ratings of roll-call voting records (ACU scores in this case), the senator's party,
 the respondent's own ideological position, and the interaction between the respon-
 dent's position and their evaluation of the senator. The first two variables in the
 perceptual model account for the influence of "objective" information on the re-
 spondent's perceptions, while the last two account for projection effects.
 This model of perceptions was estimated separately for respondents who were
 uncertain and those who were certain about their perceptions. Due to the relative
 paucity of respondents who claimed to be very certain, we combined both the
 pretty certain and the very certain responses as an indication of relative certainty.
 The null hypothesis is that these two models should show identical effects of the
 independent variables on respondent perceptions. The alternative hypothesis is
 that since uncertain respondents tend to provide a midpoint placement of the sen-
 ator, the independent variables should have less impact on perceptions. By the
 same token, the fit of the model should decline among the uncertain.
 The estimates of these models are in table 6. For uncertain respondents, the
 perceptual model fits the data very poorly. Only one variable, that for the senator's
 party, is significantly different from zero, yet it has the wrong sign. The adjusted
 R2 statistic for the model (0.00) demonstrates the lack of fit.
 This stands in sharp contrast to the model for the certain respondents. Here we
 find that both the senator's roll-call voting record and projection effects play sig-
 nificant roles in forming perceptions. This model also fits the data relatively well.
 The adjusted R2 statistic is much larger (0.23), indicating that the independent
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 variables do a reasonable job of predicting where respondents place their senators
 on the ideological scale.
 CONCLUSION: UNCERTAINTY AND POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS
 In this article, we have shown that it is possible to measure subjective uncer-
 tainty using practical survey items."3 The ubiquity of uncertainty in politics, in-
 creasingly recognized in theoretical models of elections and decisions, makes such
 measures highly desirable.
 The survey-based measures we have discussed in this article have several
 virtues. The first is that they appear to be valid measures of uncertainty, since
 they yield explicable response patterns and are related systematically to individual
 information costs and objective aspects of the perceptual objects. Our experimen-
 tation with different formats, moreover, indicated that the trichotomous measures
 are preferred.
 A second virtue of these measures is that they would cost little to include in fu-
 ture survey instruments. Unlike some survey approaches to measuring uncer-
 tainty, such as the "range formats" (Aldrich et al. 1982; Alvarez 1992), the use of
 these measures of uncertainty would not involve altering the structure of the
 seven-point policy scales nor would they destroy the historical continuity of issue
 and ideology measurement in surveys such as the National Election Studies. In
 fact, all that is required to obtain measures of uncertainty is one additional ques-
 tion for each issue. Further, they can be used with any issue question format,
 whether seven point, branching or anything else.
 A third virtue of these measures is that they reveal patterns in survey responses
 which have previously been largely ignored. More importantly, they offer sub-
 stantive and theoretically based explanations for these patterns. While we set out
 to examine respondent uncertainty, we found that uncertainty could also speak to
 theories of the survey response.
 Methodologically, then, we have shown that uncertainty can be measured in
 surveys. These uncertainty measures can also help us understand important sub-
 stantive problems as well. Uncertainty has been shown to influence voter prefer-
 ences over candidates and the information people employ in'their decision making
 (Alvarez 1992). That is, those with more uncertain information are less likely to
 be able to base decisions on that information. With our new measures of uncer-
 tainty, we will be better able to estimate the effects on uncertainty on voter deci-
 sion making.
 Another substantive area in which these measures can be fruitfully employed
 will be to determine the extent to which campaigns inform the electorate. From
 the early days of survey research (e.g., Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1968) to
 contemporary studies (e.g., Finkel 1993), researchers have frequently found that
 '3The major previous attempt reported in Aldrich et al. (1982) was not very successful. Our attempt
 in form A to duplicate this earlier measure produced similarly disappointing results.
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 campaigns play only a minor role in informing the electorate. Since these uncer-
 tainty measures are partly determined by objective information about senators, it
 is quite likely they are related to information voters obtain about candidates dur-
 ing a campaign. Increases in the flow of information about candidates may reduce
 uncertainty about candidates' positions (Alvarez 1992) though this is at least partly
 subject to manipulation by candidates (Franklin 1991). The ability to measure re-
 spondent uncertainty using these new measures should help shed light on the role
 of both the campaign and the campaigners.
 Manuscript submitted 6 April 1993
 Final manuscript received 17 December 1993
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